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1.

Introduction

Cooperation in transboundary pollution has proved, and still proves, difficult. Despite
cooperation among nations could raise global welfare because of multilateral negative
externalities, and could benefit all nations if accompanied by fair sharing arrangements, strong
free-rider incentives prevail. Curbing greenhouse gases illustrates the problems of cooperation
vividly. International response to global warming is often traced back to 1988 when the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was founded – an international body
initiated by the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) that gathers and summarizes current world-wide scientific
evidence on climate change. In 1992, at the Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro, the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was established with the aim to
promote international action to stabilise greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the
atmosphere, at levels that “avoid dangerous anthropogenic climate change”. However, it was not
until 1997 when 38 countries agreed to specific emission ceilings under the Kyoto Protocol to be
met in the “commitment period” 2008-2012. Again, it was not before 2002 when this treaty was
ratified. This did not happen before several concessions had been granted to various participants
and after the USA had declared to withdraw from the treaty.
Currently, in the light of the Stern report (Stern 2006) and the most recent IPCC report (IPCC
2007), a follow-up “Post-Kyoto” agreement is being negotiated that should set emission ceilings
for the period after 2012. The aim is to reduce emissions further and to encourage participation
of the major polluter USA, as well as the new emerging polluters China and India.
Parallel to this political development, the interest in economics to analyze the reasons and
possible remedies for the problem of international environmental cooperation emerged. One
strand of literature focused on the game theoretic analysis of international environmental
agreements (IEAs) which can be traced back to Barrett (1994), Chander and Tulkens (1992),

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper370

2

Finus et al.: Simulating a Sequential Coalition Formation Process for the

2
Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and Hoel (1991). Later papers focused on various designs and
measures that could mitigate the free-rider problem. Due to the many papers, we refer the reader
to the surveys by Barrett (2003) and Finus (2003, 2008). Other contributions departed from the
assumption of a static payoff structure of the initial papers and captured the dynamic nature of
the stock pollutants “greenhouse gases”. This is also the starting point of the second strand of
literature that ignored coalition formation but modeled optimal policy responses in integrated
assessment models that capture the dynamic interaction between the economy and the
environment and which was pioneered by Nordhaus (1994). This initiated many other papers
which are surveyed for instance in Böhringer and Löschel (2006). Naturally, there have also been
attempts to combine both strands as for instance Bosello et al. (2003), Eyckmans and Tulkens
(2003), Eyckmans and Finus (2006) and Weikard et al. (2006). On the one hand, this adds more
realism to the analysis; on the other hand, this is the only way to derive results in richer game
theoretic frameworks where analytical solutions are impossible to obtain.
This paper is in the tradition of a combined approach: it links a game theoretic module of
coalition formation to an integrated assessment numerical simulation module. The empirical
module is based on the CLIMNEG World Simulation Model (CWSM) as for instance used in
Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003), Eyckmans and Finus (2006), though we use the updated version
1.2. Different from these papers but also different from many theoretical contributions on the
formation and stability of IEAs, our game theoretic module looks at two new aspects.
First, we do not model coalition formation as a simultaneous but as a sequential decision process.
This is motivated by the observation that usually some countries take the initiative of forming
IEAs. Others join later or decide not to follow suit. The evolvement of membership in
international agreements is a typical feature of many IEAs and is reported for instance in Finus
(2003) for many environmental treaties.
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Second, despite we follow the mainstream of the literature, assuming that there is no global
authority that can enforce cooperation, we consider the possibility of a third party which aims at
coordinating actions, thereby improving upon the disappointing record of cooperation. The
analysis of a moderator, as we call it, is based on two arguments. The first argument takes a
positive view. There are many international organizations that directly or indirectly influence the
outcome of negotiations. For instance, the IPCC provides scientific evidence on climate change
of which the most important in our context is evidence on damages caused by climate change
and the costs associated with curbing greenhouse gases. Also the United Nations, in particular
the Environmental Programme (UNEP) advices parties and tries to spur action. The World Bank
administers some of the climate funds that have been set up to provide incentive of participation
for developing and least developed countries. It also plays an active role to oversee the Clean
Development Mechanism, one of the flexible instruments under the Kyoto Protocol to keep
abatement costs down. The second argument takes a normative view. It simply asks if and how a
moderator can improve upon the efforts of cooperation through coordinating actions among
nations.
With respect to both aspects this paper takes first steps, hoping to initiate more research. As we
spell out in more detail in subsequent sections, both aspects pose many conceptual problems that
require more research. It appears to us that the closest connections to recent research are the
papers by Germain et al. (2003), Rubio and Ulph (2007), Ulph (2004) and De Zeeuw (2007). We
view coalition formation as a two-stage game. In the first stage players decide upon membership
and in the second stage they decide upon their economic strategies, which are abatement
strategies and in richer models also investment in capital and research. The game is solved
backward: equilibrium economic strategies determine the payoff of players and are the basis to
decide upon membership. Stability of membership is analyzed along the entire time path. In
Germain et al. (2003) this is done in the tradition of cooperative games by invoking the concept
of core stability for the membership game. In Rubio and Ulph (2007) and Ulph (2004) this is
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analyzed by invoking the concept of internal and external stability with a stronger flavor of noncooperative game theory. All of these papers ignore the role of a coordinator and assume a
simultaneous decision about membership at each time t . Moreover, Rubio and Ulph (2007) and
Ulph (2004) assume symmetric players for analytical tractability. In contrast, we consider
heterogeneous players, a sequential membership game, the role of a moderator, though in a
simplistic way, but assume that membership decisions are based on discounted payoffs of a
differential climate game. This limitation already suggests an avenue for future research, which we
spell out in more detail in the last section of this paper. Nevertheless, we believe that our paper is
an important step for the further development of modeling the negotiation and formation
process of cooperative arrangements in international pollution control.

2.

Overview of the Model

Following Bloch (2003), we view the coalition formation process as a two-stage game. In the first
stage, players, i ∈ I = { 1,...,n } , which are world regions in our empirical context, decide upon
their membership in coalitions, which are climate agreements in our context. This stage is
modeled along the lines of the sequential move unanimity game (SMUG) proposed by Bloch
(1995). In this game, an initiator proposes a coalition. Prospective members of this coalition are
sequentially asked for acceptance. If all potential members accept, the coalition is formed. If the
proposed coalition is not the grand coalition, a new initiator among the remaining players can
make a new proposal. If a player rejects a proposal, he can make a new proposal. The formation
process continues until all players have agreed to be either a member of a (non-trivial) coalition
or decided to remain a singleton.1 The first stage of the game is described in more detail in
section 4. The decision process in the first stage leads to some coalition structure c = { c1 ,...,cm }

1

A non-trivial coalition is a coalition with at least two members.
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where c ∈ C is a partition of players in disjoint non-empty sets, ck ∩ c =∅ ∀ k ≠

∪

and

c = I .2

In the second stage, players choose their economic strategies, which are abatement and
investment strategies in the CLIMNEG world simulation model (CWSM), version 1.2, based on
the economic implications as predicted by this model. For a given coalition structure c , this
implies a payoff vector v( c ) = ( v1 ( c ),...., vn ( c )) . That is, a coalition structure c ∈ C is mapped
into a vector of individual payoffs v( c ) ∈ V ( C ) called valuations. In case a transfer scheme is
implemented, this leads to “modified valuations” viT ( c ) = vi ( c ) +Ψ i where Ψ i > 0 implies to
receive a transfer and Ψ i < 0 to pay a transfer with the understanding that transfers are only paid
among coalition members and that transfers balance, i.e.

∑

i∈c

Ψ i = 0 ∀ cl ∈ c .

The entire game is solved by backward induction. For the second stage, we follow the standard
assumption in the literature on coalition formation and solve for the coalitional Nash equilibrium in
economic strategies.3 That is, members of coalition c in coalition structure c choose their
economic strategies such as to maximize the aggregate payoff to their coalition, taking the
strategies of outsiders as given. In CWSM this payoff is the net present value of a payoff stream,
accounting for the fact that climate change is a stock pollution problem. The details of the
second stage are described in section 3.
For the first stage, which consists of many sub-stages due to the sequential coalition formation
process, we solve for the subgame-perfect equilibrium in membership strategies. That is, each
player, either in the role of an initiator or in the role of a player who is asked for acceptance
2

For instance, in the case of three players, C comprises five different coalition structures:
c1 = {{ 1},{ 2 },{ 3 }} , c 2 = {{ 1,2 },{ 3 }} , c 3 = {{ 1,3 },{ 2 }} , c 4 = {{ 1},{ 2,3 }} and c 5 = {{ 1,2,3 }} .

3

For a summary of this literature in the general context, see Bloch (2003) and in the context of IEAs,
see Finus (2003). Sometimes a coalitional Nash equilibrium is also called a coalitional equilibrium
(Ichiishi 1981) or a partial Nash equilibrium between coalitions (Chander and Tulkens 1997).
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should choose her best reply at each point in time for the rest of the game, given the strategies of
the other players. The details of the first stage are explained in section 4.

3.

Second Stage of Coalition Formation

3.1

Data and Computations

The CWSM is an integrated assessment, economy-climate model capturing the endogenous
feedback of climate change damages on production and consumption. As the seminal RICE
model by Nordhaus and Yang (1996), CWSM is a dynamic, long-term, perfect foresight, Ramseytype optimal growth model with a global climate externality. Since an extensive exposition of the
model, including the procedure of computing valuations, is provided in Eyckmans and Tulkens
(2003) and Eyckmans and Finus (2006 and 2009), we describe here only its main features. A brief
description of the main equations and parameters is provided in Appendix 1.
In CWSM, the world is divided into six regions: USA, JPN (Japan), EU (European Union), CHN
(China), FSU (Former Soviet Union) and ROW (Rest of the World). In every region, and in every
time period, output is allocated to consumption, investment, emission abatement expenditures
and climate change damages. Output is modeled as a Cobb-Douglas production function with
capital and labor input. Capital is built up through investment and depreciates at a fixed rate.
Labour supply is assumed to be inelastic. Therefore, investment is the only endogenous
production input and constitutes the first choice variable in the model. Abatement expenditures
are expressed as output losses and are a function of relative emission reduction compared to the
business-as-usual (BAU) scenario without any abatement policy. Climate change damages are also
expressed as output losses and are a function of temperature change compared to pre-industrial
times. Temperature change depends on the stock of greenhouse gases, which in turn depends on
emissions that accumulate in the atmosphere. Finally, emissions are proportional to production,
but can be reduced by abatement activities. The rate of emission abatement compared to the
BAU scenario constitutes the second choice variable in this model.
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Both choice variables (investment and abatement) affect output, abatement costs, damage costs
and therefore also consumption domestically but also abroad. With respect to abatement this is
obvious since remaining emissions (after abatement) increases the stock of greenhouse gases,
which affects environmental damages in every country. However, this is also true for investment
since capital is an input in the production process and emissions are proportional to production.
Technological progress is captured in the CWSM in an exogenous fashion. It increases the
production potential and decreases the emission-output ratio (i.e. increases energy effiency) over
time. Finally, welfare is measured as total lifetime discounted consumption.
An economic strategy vector is denoted by s* ( c ) and consists in CWSM of a time path of 35
decades for emission abatement and investment for all six regions, hence its length is 2 x 35 x 6 =
420. Valuations without transfers v( c ) = ( v1 ( c ),...,vn ( c )) for coalition structure c ∈ C are
defined as vi ( c ) := Wi ( s* ( c )) where s* ( c ) is the coalitional Nash equilibrium economic
strategy vector which is defined as:
(1)

∀c ∈ c :

∑

i∈c

Wi ( s*c ( c ),s*− s ( c )) ≥∑ i∈c Wi ( sc ( c ),s*− c ( s ) )

∀ sc ( c )

where Wi ( ) is the discounted pyaoff of player i , sc ( c ) is the economic strategy vector of
coalition c , s−c ( c ) the vector of all other regions not belonging to c and an asterisk denotes
equilibrium strategies. Determing

s* ( c ) for every coalition structure c ∈ C

(noting

vi ( c ) := Wi ( s* ( c )) ), gives the set of valuations V ( C ) .
Computationally, the coalitional Nash equilibria are computed by means of a standard iterative
algorithm assuming that all members of coalition c ∈ c jointly maximize the aggregate payoff to
their coalition

∑

i∈c

Wi ( s ) with respect to sc ( c ) , while taking the strategies of outsiders

s−c ( c ) as given. Repeating this optimization problem for each strategic player (coalition or
singleton) and iterating until strategy vectors do not change more than some prespecified
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tolerance level, gives

s* ( c )

which is substituted into

Wi

in

order

to

derive

v( c ) = ( v1 ( c ),...,vn ( c )) . Since the CWSM comprises six regions, vector v( c ) has six entries.
For each coalition structure, the equilibrium economic strategy has to be computed in order to
derive the set of valuations V(C). Because six regions imply 203 different coalition structures, the
set of valuations is a matrix of dimension 203x6. The set of coalition structures comprises the
coalition structures with only singletons (no cooperation), the coalition structure with only one
coalition, namely the grand coalition (full cooperation), 56 coalition structures with only one nontrivial coalition and some singletons (partial single cooperation), and 145 coalition structures with
at least two non-trivial coalitions (partial multiple cooperation). Thus, the dimension of our set of
valuations is larger than in Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003) because we also consider multiple
coalition structures as in Eyckmans and Finus (2006).
Strategically, this means members that belong to the same coalition behave cooperatively towards
their fellow members (otherwise cooperation would not be worthwhile analyzing), but noncooperatively towards outsiders. Economically, this means strategies are group efficient within
coalition c but not globally efficient as long as the grand coalition does not form. It also means
that the equilibrium economic strategy vector s* ( c ) corresponds to the classical “social or global
optimum” if c is the coalition structure with the grand coalition, and corresponds to the classical
“Nash equilibrium” if c is the coalition structure with only singletons. Hence, any inefficiency,
i.e. global welfare loss of partial single or partial multiple cooperation compared to the global
optimum stems from the fact that the grand coalition does not form (as this may not be an
equilibrium coalition as analyzed in the first stage of coalition formation).
Valuations with transfers are defined as viT ( c ) = vi ( c ) +Ψ i where the transfer Ψ i is paid
(Ψ i < 0 ) or received (Ψ i > 0 ) in a lump-sum fashion (expressed in discounted consumption at
time t = 0 ) and hence does not affect equilibrium economic strategies in the CWSM as proved in
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Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003). This implies a TU-framework and the transfer scheme proposed
by these authors leads to valuations
(2)

viT ( c ) = vi ( c N ) + λi ⎡ ∑ j∈c ( v j ( c ) − v j ( c N ))⎤
⎣
⎦

∀i ∈ c , ∀c ∈ c .

That is, every region i in coalition c ∈ c receives its payoff in the coalition structure with only
singletons which is denoted by c N (first term on the R.H.S. in (2); c N = {{ 1},...,{ n }} ), and
additionally a share λi ≥ 0 ,

∑

i∈c

λi = 1 , from the total coalitional surplus of cooperation when

moving from coalition structure c N with no cooperation to some other coalition structure c
(term in square brackets on the R.H.S. in (2)). Shares are those proposed by Eyckmans and
Tulkens (2003) and reflect the relation between individual and global discounted marginal climate
change damages in coalition structure c . Hence, the second term favors regions with relatively
high marginal damages since they are entitled to a larger share of the surplus of their coalition.
The motivation for this transfer scheme is twofold. First, it can be normatively argued that this
transfer scheme embodies a standard notion of fairness: regions that are hurt more by climate
change receive a higher share from the gains from cooperation. Second, already Chander and
Tulkens (1997) but also Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003) have shown that this transfer rule gives
rise to an allocation in the core in a global emission game, though we employ a different stability
concept.

3.2

Properties of Valuations

Table 1 displays individual valuations, generated by CWSM, with and without transfers for a
selection of coalition structures.4 The last two columns display aggregate valuations at the World
level in absolute and relative terms. The relative magnitudes can be interpreted as a “closing the

4

We do not display the ecological implications (i.e. total emissions and concentration) of different
coalition structures in this paper. For version 1 of CWSM, this is for instance provided in Eyckmans
and Finus (2006). The complete matrix of valuations is available upon request from the authors.

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper370

10

Finus et al.: Simulating a Sequential Coalition Formation Process for the

10
gap index” (abbreviated CGX), measuring how close a coalition structure comes to the global
optimum where the performance in the grand coalition (full cooperation) is 100 percent and the
performance in the coalition structure with only singletons (no cooperation) is 0 percent by
definition (see the legend of Table 1).
Table 1 about here
Apart from stressing that both full and partial cooperation make a difference compared to no
cooperation, Table 1 illustrates that not only the size of a coalition matters for the global success
of cooperation, but also the identity of its members. Put differently, the commonly hold view
that a high participation automatically indicates the success of an IEA may be wrong. For
instance, coalition structure No. 152 including the five members USA, JPN, EU, CHN and FSU
ranks lower than many coalition structures comprising smaller coalitions as for instance coalition
structure No. 150 and No. 151.
As a general tendency, the importance of particular regions for global welfare decreases along the
following sequence: ROW, CHN, USA, EU, FSU and JPN. ROW´s and CHN´s important role
stems from the fact that they can provide cheap abatement. Similarly, JPN´s lesser importance is
due to her steep marginal abatement cost curve. However, there is also an additional dimension
related to environmental damages. Because optimal economic strategies are derived from
coalitions maximizing the joint welfare of its members, the higher the marginal damages of
coalition members are, the higher joint abatement efforts will be, everything else being equal.
This has not only a positive spillover effect on fellow coalition members but also on outsiders.
(See more on this below.) This explains the importance of EU for cooperation.
Table 1 is also useful to illustrate five properties of our two sets of valuations, with and without
transfers, V ( C ) and V T ( C ) , respectively. These properties turn out to be useful when analyzing
the incentives of coalition formation and stability in section 4.
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The first property is called superadditivity (SAD) and means that the aggregate valuation of
coalition ck and coalition c (that may be trivial or non-trivial coalitions) increases if they merge.
Property 1: Superadditivity
A coalition game is superadditive if and only if for all ck , c ∈ c , ck ∪ c ∈ cˆ and c, cˆ ∈ C :

∑

i∈ck ∪ c

vi ( cˆ ) ≥ ∑ i∈c vi ( c ) + ∑ i∈c vi ( c ) where ĉ is derived from c by merging two coalitions in c.
k

That is, there is “coalitional gain” from cooperation and hence cooperation is “group rational” or
“coalitionally rational”. Hence, SAD provides a general incentive for cooperation. For instance,
in coalition structure No. 195 {{USA},{JPN, EU, FSU},{CHN},{ROW}}, the total payoff of
USA, JPN, EU and FSU is 496,243.2 bln$ US whereas if they merge, leading to coalition
structure No. 173 {{USA, JPN, EU, FSU},{CHN},{ROW}} the total payoff to these four
players increases to 496,428.6 bln$ US.
The intuition behind this property, which has been put forward, is: “if two coalitions merge, they
always have the option of behaving as they did when they were separate, and so their total payoff
should not fall” (Maskin 2003, p. 9). However, this intuition might be false in our context. A
sufficient condition for SAD to hold is to assume that if coalitions merge, outsiders’ equilibrium
economic strategies remain unchanged. In other words, there is no externality across coalitions.
However, this assumption does not hold in the case of the CWSM. For instance, an enlargement
of a coalition leads to a new coalitional equilibrium with higher total abatement of those players
involved in this move but lower abatement of other players. In the climate context this has been
called leakage-effect. Hence, the fact that SAD still holds in CWSM means that the leakage-effect
is sufficiently small not to contradict the good intentions of the enlarged coalition.
The second property is called positive externality (PEX), meaning that the valuation of region j
increases if coalition ck and coalition c merge where j is not involved in this merger (i.e. does
neither belong to ck nor to c ).
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Property 2: Positive Externality
A coalition game exhibits a positive externality if and only if for all ck , c ∈ c , ck ∪ c ∈ cˆ , c, cˆ ∈ C and

i ∉ ck ∪ c : vi ( cˆ ) ≥ vi ( c ) where ĉ is derived from c by merging two coalitions in c.
In contrast to SAD, which may be seen as a positive internal spillover to those players increasing
the degree of cooperation (through the merger of coalitions), PEX implies a positive spillover to
outsiders. Hence, PEX makes free-riding attractive and works in the opposite direction than SAD
in terms of the incentives for cooperation.5
The driving force behind this property can be decomposed into two effects, which are closely
related to our explanation above, why SAD could, in principle, fail to hold. First, global
abatement will increase after the merger as the new coalition will increase abatement efforts.
Although outsiders will respond to the coalition’s increase of abatement by reducing their own
abatement efforts, this response is less than proportional (i.e. incomplete leakage). The resulting
net increase of global abatement is beneficial to all players because it reduces climate change
damages. Second, outsiders to the merger incur lower abatement costs due to reduced abatement
efforts.
The property PEX is evident for instance in Table 1 by comparing again coalition structures No.
195 and No. 173. In No. 195, the singleton players CHN and ROW receive a payoff of 299,267.3
bln$ US and 345,276 bln$ US, respectively, whereas in No. 173, after the USA has joined the
coalition {JPN, EU, FSU}, their payoffs are given by 300,001.6 bln$ US and 346,569.3 bln$ US,
respectively.
Table 1 also illustrates that PEX usually makes it most attractive from a single region´s point of
view that all players cooperate, except the region itself, irrespective whether transfers are

5

From the recent literature on coalition theory it appears that many economic problems either belong
to positive or negative externality games for which some general results can be derived. See for
instance Bloch (2003) and Yi (2003).
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assumed. The only exceptions are ROW in case of no transfers and ROW and JPN in case of
transfers. The highest valuation from a region’s point of view are indicated bold in Table 1.
It is evident that superadditivity and positive externality are sufficient (though not necessary)
conditions that aggregate welfare across all players increases through cooperation. That is, given a
coalition structure c , whenever single regions or non-trivial coalitions merge, global welfare is
raised. That is, cooperation is globally rational - a central property that provides a strong
normative motivation for the analysis of self-enforcing agreements in the presence of free-rider
incentives in global pollution control.
The third property is called individual rationality (IR) and means that a region receives a (weakly)
higher valuation than in the coalition structure with only singletons.
Property 3: Individual Rationality
A coalition structure c ∈ C with associated valuation v( c ) ∈ V ( C ) is individually rational if and only if for
all i ∈ N : vi ( c ) ≥ vi ( c N ) where c N = {{ 1},...,{ n }} is the coalition structure with only singletons.
Individual rationality is a necessary condition for the participation of a region in a non-trivial
coalition because by remaining a singleton a region receives at least its valuation in the coalition
structure with only singletons due to positive externalities. In the case of no transfers, it is evident
from Table 1 that some coalition structures are not individually rational to all parties. Examples
include the grand coalition with rank No. 1 and the coalition structure No. 2 which are not
individually rational for FSU, provided there are no transfers.
The reason for the lack of individual rationality is that joint welfare maximization may imply an
asymmetric distribution of the gains from cooperation. For instance, in CWSM, FSU benefits
little from cooperation because of her flat marginal damage cost function. Moreover, due to her
flat marginal abatement cost function she has to contribute much to cooperative efforts to curb
emissions. However, with transfers, all valuations vT ( c ) ∈ V T ( C ) are IR. Due to SAD, the term
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in square brackets in our transfer formula (2) is always positive and hence viT ( c ) ≥ vi ( c N ) for all
regions that are members of a non-trivial coalition. As observed above, for all singletons

vi ( c ) = viT ( c ) ≥ vi ( c N ) holds anyway because of PEX. Note that the set of IR coalition
structures is never empty because the coalition structure with only singletons is IR by
Definition 3.
The fourth property is called Pareto-optimality (PO). A coalition structure is PO if there is no
other coalition structure where at least one region is better off and no other region is worse off.
Property 4: Pareto-optimality
A coalition structure c ∈ C with associated valuations v( c ) ∈ V ( C ) is Pareto-optimal with respect to V ( C )
if there is no other coalition structure c ∈ C with v( c ) ∈ V ( C ) such that vi ( c ) ≥ vi ( c ) ∀ i∈I ∧ ∃ j∈I:

vj( c ) > vj( c ) .
This definition is the well-known definition of Pareto-optimality applied to the context of
coalition formation. Note that PO relates only to a particular set of valuations, i.e. in our context
either to V ( C ) without transfers or to V T ( C ) with transfers. Though PO coalition structures
are not indicated in Table 1, it easily checked that coalition structure No. 152 is Pareto-dominated
by the grand coalition with rank No. 1 and coalition structures No. 173, 195 and 203 are Paretodominated by coalition structure No. 3 where this holds with and without transfers. Obviously,
the grand coalition is always a PO - regardless whether we consider V ( C ) or V T ( C ) - because
it generates the (strictly) highest global welfare. It is also evident that the singleton coalition
structure can never be a PO if a transfer scheme guarantees individual rationality as applies to

V T ( C ) as argued above.
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Property 5: Strict Individual Preferences
Players have strict individual preferences over coalition structures if and only if for every pair of distinct coalition
structures c ∈ C and c ∈ C with c ≠ c it holds that: ∀ i∈I: vi ( c ) > vi ( c ) or vi ( c ) < vi ( c ) .
Our last property is called strict individual preferences (SIP). It implies that every player can rank
coalition structures according to his valuations in the entire set of coalition structures. In other
words, players are never indifferent between two different coalition structures. SIP is mainly a
technical property which holds for CWSM and eases the determination of equilibrium coalition
structures.

4.

First Stage of Coalition Formation

4.1

Original Game

Based on valuations, either on valuations with or without transfers, V(C) or V T (C) , derived in
the second stage of coalition formation, players decide upon participation in coalitions in a
sequential process. The process is modeled based on the sequential move unanimity game
(SMUG) of Bloch (1995), though for our purposes some changes are necessary which we discuss
below. This game is in the spirit of Rubinstein´s (1982) two-player alternating offers bargaining
game and is a generalization of Chatterjee et al.´s (1993) extension to an n-player bargaining
game. The SMUG assumes that players are ordered according to some rule. The player with the
lowest index (initiator), say, player 1, starts by announcing a list of coalition members including
himself. Every member on the list is asked whether he or she accepts the proposal. The player
with the lowest index on this list is asked first, then the player with the second lowest index and
so forth. If all players on the list agree, the coalition, say, c1 , is formed and coalitions among the
remaining players I \ c1 may form. The player with the lowest index among I \ c1 becomes the
new initiator. If a player rejects a proposal, he can make a new proposal.
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Thus, a coalition only forms by unanimous agreement. Because a player can always reject a
proposal, participation in a non-trivial coalition is voluntary. Both features are well in line with
the institutional setting of international environmental agreements. It is also evident that players
whose proposals have been turned down are still part of the formation process. They may
become members of other coalitions than those they have proposed. Also players that have
turned down a proposal are still part of the game since they can propose a new coalition. Only if
n-1 players have already formed a coalition, the last remaining player will have no other choice
than to become a singleton. When the negotiation process terminates, all players receive their
payoffs.
For simplification, Bloch (1995, 1996) assumes no discounting of valuations during this process.
He also assumes that players who cannot agree on a coalition receive a payoff which is Paretodominated by payoffs in every coalition structure. Thus, the solution to the game becomes
“finite”. Moreover, he only considers stationary perfect equilibrium strategies in order to reduce
the amount of possible equilibria. That is, strategies only depend on the current state (and not on
the entire history of the game) in the negotiation process of which there are basically three:
1)

There is an ongoing proposal which the player who moves may accept or reject.

2)

A player has rejected a proposal and makes a proposal himself.

3)

A coalition has formed and a player becomes the new initiator.

Therefore, the payoff relevant part of the history at some stage is the set of players who have left
the game already, the partition they have formed and the current offer. A sequence of proposals
is a perfect equilibrium if proposals and reactions to proposals are mutually best replies for each
possible state in the remaining game.
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To the best of our knowledge, until now, Bloch´s game has only be applied to economic
problems with the assumption that all players have the same payoff function.6 For ex-ante
symmetric players as this assumption has been termed in the literature, Bloch (1996) has shown
that things simplify substantially since the identity of players does not matter and – in most
economic examples of interest - payoffs to a player only depend on the sizes of his own and the
remaining coalitions in a given coalition structure c .7 Hence, the sequence in which players make
proposals and counter-proposals, as well as the sequence according to which players are asked for
acceptance does not matter for the outcome of coalition formation. Moreover, a proposal means
to announce the size of a coalition to which the proposer wants to belong and hence the entire
game reduces to a “size announcement game” in which the interests of the proposer and the
members of the coalition that she proposes always coincide.
Clearly, some simplifications would not be appropriate in our context, in particular as we have
not only ex-post but also ex-ante different players. Therefore, we discuss in the next section some
problems related to the implementation and solution of the SMUG and the valuations derived
from the CWSM.

4.2

Issues of Implementation

There are three issues that have to be discussed for the implementation and the solution of the
SMUG in our empirical context.

6

See Bloch (2003) for an overview. Bloch’s game has been applied for instance by Finus and
Rundshagen (2006a) and Ray and Vohra (2001) in the context of the provision of public goods; both
applications assuming symmetric players.

7

For instance, in a global emission abatement game with a static payoff function Finus and
Rundshagen (2003) have shown that, in a given coalition structure, members of larger coalitions
receive a lower valuation than members of smaller coalitions because all players receive the same
benefits from global abatement but members of larger coalitions choose higher individual abatement
levels and therefore have higher abatement costs.
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Sequence of Proposals
Bloch assumes that players are indexed according to some exogenous rule. Though for ex-ante
symmetric players this sequence has no effect on the outcome, it will be crucial for asymmetric
players. The sequence is an essential element in the strategic considerations of players and affects
for instance decision whom an initiator approaches first. However, the crucial question arises
how the first initiator is determined and who will be the subsequent initiator if a coalition has
formed? Intuitively, one may want to endogenize this sequence, making it part of the bargaining
game itself.
It could be argued for instance that the first initiator is the player who gains most from
cooperation. However, then the question arises how this gain is computed? One reference point
could be the valuation without any cooperation but the second reference point is anything else
than obvious. Is it the valuation that a player receives on average from cooperation if he is a
member of a coalition and is the gain measured in absolute or relative terms? However, the
average is also not convincing because this would include valuations of coalition structures that
may never emerge as an equilibrium. But also the average of valuations over all equilibrium
coalition structures for all possible index sequences is not an innocuous selection criterion for
several reasons but in particular not because equilibria depend on the sequence itself and hence
there is a feedback relation that seems difficult to solve.
We will not pursue this discussion here, noting that this issue might be an important topic for
future research, though beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we stick to the original proposal
of Bloch. We solve for the equilibrium coalition structure for every possible index sequence of
which there are 720 in the case of six players. The analysis of our results in section 5 will focus on
the effect of different sequences on the outcome of coalition formation. Important questions will
be for instance: which regions should be among the initiators in order to induce successful
cooperation from a global point of view? Is it an advantage to be an initiator or is a wait-and-seestrategy more promising for individual regions? Moreover, in section 5, we will analyze whether a
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moderator, though without enforcement power, can influence the outcome by coordinating the
sequence in the negotiations.
Cycles of Proposals
Generally, the bargaining game may have an infinite horizon and therefore may have no solution.
Suppose players have very different preferences about their most preferred outcome. Then if all
players insist on their most preferred outcome, this may lead to an infinite number of proposals
and rejections. As mentioned, a simple way of avoiding those cycles is to assume that if players
do not agree in finite time, they will end up with a Pareto-inferior outcome compared to the
valuations of all possible coalition structures. Though this may seem an elegant solution in a
theoretical setting, we think it is not appropriate in our empirical setting for two reasons.
First, viewing the coalition structure with only singletons as the starting point of negotiations,
there seems to be no plausible reason why regions should not receive at least this payoff if
negotiations fail. One way out of the dilemma of cycles could be discounting. Apart from the
question which discount rates are appropriate and which discount rates avoid cycles, this would
raise some other conceptual questions. For instance, does time elapse after a player has been
asked for acceptance or after a player has rejected a proposal? Moreover, given that in our
context valuations are derived from a dynamic integrated assessment model, it would not be
consistent to discount valuations only. Instead, this required that also equilibrium economic
strategies would have to be revised if time passes by. It is evident that this would be an interesting
and certainly fruitful approach of modeling negotiations over climate policy but is beyond the
scope of this paper.
We follow a pragmatic approach that is inspired by software programs modeling chess and other
games. At the time of an ongoing proposal and as long as no additional coalition has formed, the
same player cannot make a second proposal if her first proposal has been turned down. It is
important to note that this rule only applies if the game does not proceed. If a coalition has
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eventually formed at stage t , this player can again make a proposal at t + 1 (provided she has not
accepted already another proposal).
Second, solving the game with an algorithm requires a well defined amount of finite branches.
Our pragmatic solution ensures this whereas this would not be true for many other possible
assumptions, like discounting. The strategic implications are illustrated with simple examples in
subsection 4.4.
Indifference of Proposals
Generally, valuations of different coalition structures may be identical for some players. Hence,
the equilibrium path in the SMUG would not be uniquely determined. In a theoretical setting
with only few players this problem can certainly be ignored by just computing all equilibria. In
our context of six players, however, this would increase computation time tremendously.
Fortunately, we can ignore this problem because for our data set all players have a strict
individual preference overall all valuations, with and without transfers (see section 3.2, property
5).

4.3

Description of the Algorithm

As argued above, we have to modify Bloch’s coalition game SMUG slightly, which we call Finite
Sequential Move Unanimity Game (FSMUG). As the SMUG has already been described in much
detail in subsection 4.1, and relevant issues of implementation in subsection 4.2, we only add
some final definitions and briefly comment on the algorithm that we use for solving for
equilibrium coalition structures.
We order players, i.e. regions in CWSM, randomly and then generate all permutations. That is,
the index number of player i is π ( i ) with π : I → I denoting the corresponding permutation.
In the case of n players, there are n! permutations. At any node in the game tree, the history ht
contains the following payoff relevant information which describes the state of the game:
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-

a set K̂ of players who have already formed coalitions,

-

a coalition structure ĉ formed by the players of K̂ ,

-

an ongoing proposal (if any) T̂ ,

-

a set Â of players who have already accepted the proposal,

-

the player â who moves at node t ,

-

the initiator î of the ongoing proposal and

-

the set of players Î who may become initiators during the formation process of the next
coalition.

The last two items distinguish the FSMUG from the original SMUG by Bloch because we
assume that an initiator can make only one proposal as long as no further coalition has been
formed. Like in Bloch (1995), the relevant history at time t , ht , depends only on the current
state of the game at time t (and not on the entire history of the game). Hence, equilibrium
coalition structures are derived as stationary perfect equilibrium which is a vector of strategies for
all players such that, after each relevant history of the game, all players choose an optimal action.
The algorithm is visualized in Appendix 2. It is a backtracking algorithm along the lines for
instance described in Alho et al. (1987). The algorithm is programmed in Java, version 1.4.2.

4.4

Properties and Strategies

We first briefly and informally show that our FSMUG - applied to our valuations V ( C ) and

V T ( C ) derived from CWSM - possesses some essential properties which are important for
determining equilibrium coalition structures. Then, we illustrate some interesting implications for
the optimal strategies of players. For this we use simple examples with three players as the driving
forces would be difficult to trace in our application with six players.
First note that an equilibrium in the FSMUG always exists and the equilibrium coalition structure
is unique for given index sequence. This follows from three items: a) the game tree is finite by
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construction, b) there is perfect information with respect to the history of the game and hence
every information set consists of only one decision node and c) at every decision node an active
player is only indifferent between two or more actions if the equilibrium coalition structures of
the subgame coincide because every player has a strict preference order over all coalition
structures (i.e. property 5: SIP in section 3.2 holds).
Second note that all equilibria (e.g. emerging from different index sequences or different sets of
valuations) will be individually rational. Regardless of the coalition which has formed in the game,
a player i can always remain a singleton by proposing coalition { i } , which ensures him at least
the payoff in the singleton coalition structures due to the positive externality (i.e. property 2: PEX
in section 3.2 holds).
Example 1 in Table 2 shall illustrate the interesting phenomenon that a player may intentionally
put forward a proposal that she knows will be turned down. First note that players 2 and 3 derive
their highest valuation when the other two players form a coalition and they free-ride. Hence, if
either player 2 or 3 is the initiator, they propose a single coalition. Since the singleton coalition
structure c1 is Pareto-dominated by all other coalition structures, the remaining players will form
a coalition of two players. Thus, if player 2 is the initiator c 3 = {{ 1,3 },{ 2 }} and if player 3 is the
initiator, c 2 = {{ 1,2 },{ 3 }} will emerge as the equilibrium coalition structure.
Example 1: Provoked Non-Acceptance Game

∑

Coalition Structure

v1 ( c )

v2 ( c )

v3 ( c )

c1 = {{ 1},{ 2 },{ 3 }}

0

0

0

0

c 2 = {{ 1,2 },{ 3 }}

2

2

8

12

c 3 = {{ 1,3 },{ 2 }}

8

8

2

18

c 4 = {{ 1},{ 2,3 }}

4

4

4

12

c 5 = {{ 1,2,3 }}

7

7

7

21

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2009

3

v (c)

i =1 i

23

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 370 [2009]

23
A more interesting strategy is observed when player 1 is the initiator. Her most preferred
coalition structure is c 3 = {{ 1,3 },{ 2 }} . However, suppose she proposed this, then player 3
would turn down her offer and would simple propose { 3 } . Now, player 1 and 2 would have no
better option than to agree on forming a coalition together and hence c 2 = {{ 1,2 },{ 3 }} would
form which is player 1’s second worst option. Thus, player 1 proposes { 1,2 } which she knows
will not be accepted by player 2. That is, she passes on the right to make a proposal to player 2,
knowing that he will act in her best interest: player 2 will propose { 2 } so that player 3 has to
give in and forms a coalition with player 1. Hence, c 3 = {{ 1,3 },{ 2 }} emerges as the equilibrium.
In other words, players 1 and 2’s interest are in line and player 1 can only get her way be letting
player 2 make the first effective move. Hence, c 3 = {{ 1,3 },{ 2 }} is the equilibrium if player 1 is
the initiator.
Example 1 also illustrates that the equilibrium outcome depends on the sequence of players.
Moreover, moving first can be associated with an advantage. Regardless who kicks off the game,
she can implement her most preferred coalition structure. That this is not always the case will be
illustrated in example 2 below.
In example 2 there are only two Pareto-undominated coalition structures, namely c 2 and c 5 .
Coalition structure c 2 is the most preferred outcome of player 1 and c 5 of players 2 and 3.
Suppose player 1 is the initiator. If he proposed { 1,2 } , and player 2 accepted, then c 2 would
form. However because c 2 is only player 2’s second best option, and player 2 and 3 both prefer
the grand coalition c 5 , player 2 could propose the grand coalition. Given that player 1 cannot
make a new proposal as long as the game has not proceeded, and the grand coalition Paretodominates the singleton coalition structure c1 , player 1 would have to accept this proposal.
However, c 5 is only player 1’s third-best alternative. Consequently, player 1, anticipating all this,
proposes { 1} in equilibrium, knowing that players 2 and 3 prefer to form a coalition together
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instead of remaining singletons. Thus, the equilibrium coalition structure if player 1 is the initiator
(regardless how players 2 and 3 are ordered), is coalition structure c 4 = {{ 1},{ 2,3 }} .
Example 2: Pareto-dominated Equilibrium Game

∑

Coalition Structure

v1 ( c )

v2 ( c )

v3 ( c )

c1 = {{ 1},{ 2 },{ 3 }}

0

0

0

0

c 2 = {{ 1,2 },{ 3 }}

6

2

4

12

c 3 = {{ 1,3 },{ 2 }}

1

1

1

3

c 4 = {{ 1},{ 2,3 }}

5

1

3

9

c 5 = {{ 1,2,3 }}

3

6

5

14

3

v (c)

i =1 i

Since c 4 is Pareto-dominated by c 2 , this example illustrates that there are instances where a
Pareto-dominated equilibrium coalition structure can emerge as an equilibrium due to strategic
considerations. Moreover, it shows that an initiator cannot always push through her most
preferred outcome. This is also the case if either player 2 or 3 are the initiators, though in this
case a Pareto-optimal coalition structure (i.e. c 2 ) is the equilibrium outcome.
If either player 2 or 3 moves first, they anticipate that they cannot enforce their most preferred
coalition structure c 5 as player 1 will raise objections. Hence, both players try to enforce their
second-best option which is c 2 and which they know will be accepted by player 1, as it is his
first-best option. Hence, if player 2 is the initiator, he will propose { 1,2 } , which player 1 will
accept, leaving player 3 as a singleton. If player 3 is the initiator, she proposes { 3 } and player 1
and 2 form { 1,2 } .
Thus, if either player 2 or 3 is the initiator, they cannot implement their first choice as an
equilibrium (as this is the case if player 1 is the initiator). Even more important, they make
proposals which lead to the most preferred coalition structure of player 1. In other words, from
player 1’s point of view, there is an advantage not to move first.
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5.

Results

In this section we display and discuss equilibrium coalition structures based on the valuations in
CWSM. We start with the standard assumption which means that there is no moderator (section
5.1). We then have a look whether a moderator can change the outcome through coordinating
actions among regions, though without being equipped with enforcement power (section 5.2).

5.1

Without Moderator

Table 2 displays equilibrium coalition structures for the case of no transfers and the case of
transfers. In the case of no transfers, there are 11 equilibrium coalition structures, in the case of
transfers, there are only two. Equilibrium coalition structures are sorted according to welfare at
the world level in descending order. The ranks for different regions within the set of equilibria
are indicated in the columns under the heading “Ranking”. The first entry in the column “PO”
indicates whether the coalition structure is Pareto-undominated among the entire set of coalition
structures of which there are 203. The second entry in this column indicates whether the
coalition structure is Pareto-undominated among the set of equilibrium coalition structures. The
frequency of occurrence of a coalition structure among the 720 possible index sequences is
indicated in the last column.
Table 2 about here
We would like to point out four general observations. First, equilibrium coalition structures
emerge that are not a PO among the set of possible coalition structures. This possibility was
illustrated in example 2 in section 4.4 and is due to the strategic characteristics of the coalition
formation game. As in example 2, this even occurs if Pareto-dominance is only checked among
the set of equilibrium coalition structures. As we will illustrate, this last remark is the motivation
to analyze the role of a moderator.
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Second, nearly all equilibrium coalition structures include multiple non-trivial coalitions. Hence, if
players have not only the option to join an agreement or to remain a singleton, coalition
structures with multiple coalitions emerge in equilibrium. This observation is in line with
simulation results for instance in Finus et al. (2009) and Eyckmans and Finus (2006) and the
theoretical findings in Carraro (2000) and Finus and Runsdhagen (2003), though they assume a
simultaneous coalition formation process under various membership rules. The relative high
average CGX is due to the fact that the FSMUG de facto implies that a coalition only forms if
and only if all players unanimously agree to form exactly this coalition. That is, a high degree of
unanimity is conducive to the success of coalition formation as spelled out for instance in
Eyckmans and Finus (2006) and Finus and Rundshagen (2006b). However, the grand coalition is
not stable.
Third, transfers lead to a higher average CGX than no transfers. Transfers seem to align interests
more among heterogeneous players for our data set, as they lead to a more symmetric
distribution of the gains from cooperation (at least all coalition structures are individually
rational), which leads to one equilibrium coalition structure in 98 percent of the possible index
sequences. This is different for no transfers where the index sequence matters much more.
Nevertheless, also here the first three ranked equilibrium coalition structures (which are Paretoundominated) appear with a frequency of 599 all together, amounting to 83 percent of the
possible index sequences. All together, we confirm the positive effect of transfers for the success
of coalition formation that has been found for simultaneous coalition formation games. See for
instance Botteon and Carraro (1997), Carraro et al. (2006), Eyckmans and Finus (2006), Weikart
et al. (2006) among many others.
Fourth, irrespective whether we consider no transfers or transfers, there is no equilibrium
coalition structure which is the most preferred for a particular region among the entire set of
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coalition structures.8 In other words, no region, regardless of the sequence in which they make
proposals, can enforce its most preferred coalition structure. A similar conclusion, though less
pronounced emerges from Table 3.
Table 3 looks at the most preferred and least preferred equilibrium from a region’s point of view
among the set of equilibrium coalition structures. Percentages indicate the frequency that region

i is among the first three in the index sequence when this equilibrium emerges. For instance,
USA’s most preferred equilibrium for no transfers is the first equilibrium coalition structure
displayed in Table 2. It occurs 32 times. In 30 instances, the USA is among the first three players
and hence 30/32=93.8%. Thus, the USA has a first mover advantage when it comes to her most
preferred equilibrium. Similarly, USA’s worst equilibrium is ranked no. 10 at the world scale (see
Table 2, no transfers). It occurs 78 times and in 12 instances the USA is among the first three
players and hence 12/78=15.4%. Put differently, in 84.6% of the cases the USA can not avoid
the worst outcome because of her late mover position. This relation can be interpreted as a first
mover advantage to avoid bad outcomes.
The other entries for other regions in Table 3 are computed in the same way. Hence, in row
“Best Equilibrium”, a percentage above 50% indicates a first mover advantage (indicated bold)
and in row “Worst Equilibrium” this is true for a percentage below 50% (indicated bold). Thus,
only in the case of transfers there seems to be on average a first mover advantage. This is in line
with our example 2 in section 4.4 which showed that it is not always in the interest of a player to
move first, i.e. there may be a last or later mover advantage. It appears that – on average - there is
a first-mover advantage to avoid the worst outcome.
In the context of the provision of a public good, two incentives can roughly be identified to
explain this, though incentives are far more complex for the valuations derived from CWSM. On
the one hand, moving first provides the possibility to free-ride by either proposing to remain a

8

This is evident by comparing Table 1 and 2.
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singleton or being only a member of a small coalition. This, however, requires that the player can
expect that others cooperate if he commits to little cooperation. On the other hand, it can also be
advantageous to move later in the game, hoping that others commit to cooperation. In a simple
symmetric player context and public good provision Finus and Rundshagen (2006a) have shown
that only the first incentive is at work.9 Now, in the case of heterogeneous players, obviously, also
the second incentive seems to be relevant in some instances.

5.2

With Moderator

Until now, we assumed that there is no third party that can enforce cooperation. This is in line
with the institutional setting in which IEAs operate. In the following, we do not give up this
assumption, but consider that a third party may act as a moderator by coordinating action. Thus,
the moderator can only make recommendations to the various parties. From a policy perspective,
analyzing the role of a moderator seems suggestive as many international organizations like the
World Bank, the United Nations with its environmental program or the International Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) are involved in climate negotiations. From a game theoretic point of
view we have seen that some equilibrium coalition structures are Pareto-dominated, even in the
set of equilibrium coalition structures. Hence, it seems natural to ask the question whether a
moderator can improve upon these outcomes.
In actual negotiations, international organizations perform many and complex tasks. However, in
our model, we consider this role only in a very stylized and therefore simplistic way.
Nevertheless, we believe that our analysis highlights the importance of moderators for future
climate negotiations. Not only from a normative point of view, but also from a positive
perspective there is a need to explain the existence of international organizations.

9

In example 1 in section 4.4, this free-rider incentive could also be observed if either player 2 or 3
moves first, though the game is not symmetric.
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Without moderator and further a priori information, it seems reasonable to expect that each
index sequence is equally likely to occur. If we let vi ( c* ) denote the valuation by player i from
equilibrium coalition structure c* (of which there are for instance 11 in the case of no transfers;
see Table 2), the frequency with which coalition structure c* emerges among the n! possible
permutations of players (i.e. possible index sequences) by FR( c* ) , then the probability that
equilibrium coalition structure c* emerges is p( c* ) = FR( c* ) / n! and the expected valuation of

∑

player i in the FSMUG is simply E( vi ) =

p( c ) ⋅ vi ( c* ) with C* the set of equilibrium

c ∈C
*

*

coalition structures. The total expected valuation is

∑

n
i =1

E( vi ) , which can be interpreted as the

average aggregate welfare. In Table 2 this value was expressed in relative terms as average CGX
(e.g. ∅ = 77.3 in the case of no transfers).
Now we assume that the moderator can propose probabilities different from p( c* ) which we
denote z( c* ) . We assume that the aim of the moderator is to maximize total expected valuation
subject to the constraint that no player is worse off accepting this proposal.
(3)

max

∑ ( z( c )∑
*

c* ∈C*

s.t.

∑ z( c

*

n

v ( c* )

i =1 i

)

)vi ( c* ) ≥ E( vi ) ∀ i ∈ { 1,...,n }

c* ∈C*

0 ≤ z( c* ) ≤ 1 ∀ c* ∈ C* and

∑ z( c

*

)=1

c ∈C
*

*

Since vi ( c* ) and E( vi ) are constants and the objective function as well as all constraints are
linear, this is a standard linear programming problem. The solutions z( c* ) will not differ from

p( c* ) if, as in the case of transfers in Table 2, there are only two coalition structures of which
none Pareto-dominates the other. However, in the case of no transfers, this is different and the
moderator can raise expected welfare from ∅CGX = 77.3 to ∅CGX = 80.4 . The moderator
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will attach to all Pareto-dominated equilibrium coalition structures within the set of equilibria, a
probability of zero. Moreover, all equilibrium structure that are Pareto-dominated by a
combination of other equilibrium coalition structures also receive probability zero. This implies
in the case of no transfers that to only two out of 11 equilibrium coalition structures a probability

z( c* ) > 0 is attached, which are the first two coalition structures listed in Table 2.

5.3

Sensitivity Analysis

Since our results have been obtained by simulations, we test the robustness of our conclusions.
As appears from the discussion in the previous sections, we are not interested in quantitative
results, but in qualitative conclusions. This seems suggestive given the large uncertainty
surrounding the calibration of the parameters of integrated assessment models. Among the main
parameters that enter CWSM, we focus on a variation of the discount rate as there has been
much debate about the appropriate choice of the discount rate (time preference rate). Hence, we
consider instead of δ = 0.01 (see Appendix 1) also two other values, δ = 0.02 and δ = 0.03 , for
which we produce tables in the spirit of Tables 2 and 3 and which are available upon request.
From this sensitivity analysis the following conclusions can be drawn.
Despite some equilibrium coalition structures differ, all other conclusions are very robust.
Average success rates measured as average CGX remain very similar. The general observations
mentioned in section 5.1 also remain true. Equilibrium coalition structures emerge that are not
Pareto-optimal among the entire set of coalition structures and some are even Pareto-dominated
by other equilibrium coalition structures, and this happens more frequently in the absence of
transfers.
Nearly all equilibrium coalition structures comprise multiple non-trivial coalitions and transfers
lead to a higher average CGX, at least if a moderator supports negotiations. Regions can never
push through their most preferred coalition structure regardless of the sequence in the
negotiations, though there is now one exception: FSU. However, interestingly, when this most
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preferred coalition structure emerges, the percentage of instances in which FSU is among the first
three regions in the index sequence is below 50%, suggesting that there is no first but a later
mover advantage for FSU. Also for other players there is no indication of first-mover advantage
on average concerning their most preferred outcome, suggesting that a wait-and-see-strategy can
be attractive to the participants in climate negotiations.

6.

Summary and Conclusions

We combined two modules, an empirical model on climate change and a game theoretic model of
coalition formation, to study self-enforcing climate agreements. The empirical model was the
Climate Change World Simulation Model (CWSM), version 1.2, which is a dynamic optimal
growth model that captures the feedback between the economy and climate change for six world
regions. We computed payoffs for all possible partitions of players, called valuations, allowing for
the possibility of the co-existence of several coalitions. Based on these valuations, we determined
stable coalition structures.
We considered two new conceptual issues of coalition formation in the context of IEAs. The
first issue was the sequential coalition formation process as such. This novelty was motivated by
the empirical evidence that participation in IEAs have evolved sequentially in the past. We argued
that the sequential move unanimity game proposed by Bloch (1995) has to be modified for
practical purposes in order to avoid infinite cyclical proposals. We introduced the assumption
that a player whose proposal has been turned down, cannot make a second proposal as long as
the formation process has not proceeded. This allowed us to develop a backtracking algorithm to
solve for equilibrium coalition structures. The second issue was the analysis of a moderator who
coordinates the negotiation process but can only make recommendations which are selfenforcing and Pareto-improving to all parties. This novelty was motivated by positive and
normative arguments. Among those were the empirical evidence that many international
organizations play some role in shaping and coordinating IEAs, but the scientific literature could
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not yet provide a rationale for their existence and their role. Moreover, even if we acknowledge
the fact that these organizations have no enforcement power, it is important to explore whether
and how they can foster international cooperation which is desperately needed to address for
instance the problem of global warming.
One part of our results illustrated the strategic properties of a sequential coalition formation
process. For instance, we showed that there is not always a first-mover advantage, but a wait-andsee-strategy may well pay. Negotiators may even have an incentive to put forward a proposal
which they know will be turned down in order to benefit from a later mover advantage. Due to
strategic considerations and strong free-rider incentives, equilibrium coalition structures may not
be Pareto-optimal. It also clearly emerged that it is very unlikely that single negotiators can push
through their most preferred outcome, irrespective of the sequence when they move.
Another part of the results confirmed conclusions derived from a simultaneous coalition
formation process. Due to large asymmetries across the world in the climate change context in
terms of the environmental damages and abatement cost, compensation payments are conducive
to establish effective cooperation. Moreover, if participation is not restricted exogenously to a
single agreement, multiple coalitions will emerge as equilibrium outcomes. As argued for instance
in Eyckmans and Finus (2006) and Finus et al. (2009), this may be taken as indication to revise
previous policy strategies. As long as free-rider incentives do not allow forming a climate
agreement with full participation, it may be worthwhile to allow for bilateral agreements instead
of focusing on a single treaty. Finally, we showed that if multiple equilibria exist, a moderator
may play an important role by helping to avoid bad outcomes.
From our results two main avenues for future research emerge. First, the role of moderators and
coordinators for shaping IEAs should be explored further. The aim should be to model this in a
less stylized way as we did and to explore the possibilities available to international organizations
to play a constructive role in initiating IEAs, coordinating negotiations and helping to formulate
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ambitious though realistic policy goals as well as implementing and monitoring agreements.
Second, more conceptual work is needed to capture the dynamic nature of the formation of IEAs
in terms of participation, policy goals, enforcement and the stock pollutant nature of greenhouse
gases. This is certainly a non-trivial challenge but would help to base policy recommendations for
the design of successful future IEAs on a more realistic basis. After all, it is not to be expected
that problems like climate change, the depletion of the ozone layer or biodiversity will disappear
in the future.
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Appendix 1
Figure A.1 shows the CLIMNEG World Simulation Model10, version 1.2, which consists of two
main blocks of equations: the economy (left) and the climate module (right). Subindices t denote
time (in steps of 10 years11) and indices i indicate the region. Exogenous processes are indicated
by an overbar.
Figure A.1: Schematic Overview of CLIMNEG World Simulation Model
individual
emissions

E i,t = αi,t ⎡⎣1 − μi,t ⎤⎦ Yi,t
γ 1−γ
Yi,t = ai,t K i,t
Li,t

production

∑E
capital accumulation

K i,t +1 = [1 − δK ] K i,t + Ii,t

j,t

j∈N

global
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carbon cycle

K i,0 given

Matt +1 = Matt + τ11Matt + τ21Muo
t

+

∑E

j,t
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j∈N
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Zi,t = Yi,t − Ii,t − Yi,t Ci (μi,t ) − Yi,t Di ( ΔTt )

Ci (μi,t ) =

Muo
t +1

= Muo
t

+ τ12Matt

Mlot +1 = Mlot

Ft =

b
bi,1μi,ti,2

abatement costs

climate change damages

Wi =

Ω

Zi,t

∑ [1 + ρ]
t =0

t

M0uo given

lo
+ τ23Muo
t + τ33Mt

Mlo0 given

4.1 ln(M att M 0at )
+ Ftx
ln(2)

radiative
forcing

Tto = Tto−1 + τ3 ⎡⎣ Ttat−1 − Tto−1 ⎤⎦
Ttat = Ttat−1 + τ1 ⎡⎣ Ft − λTtat−1 ⎤⎦ − τ2 ⎡⎣Ttat−1 − Tto−1 ⎤⎦

individual welfare
objective function

ECONOMY MODULE

10

+ τ32Mlot

global temperature module

θ

Di ( ΔTt ) = θi,1ΔTt i,2

+ τ22Muo
t

ΔTt =

Ttat
2.50

CLIMATE MODULE

The GAMS code for the simulations is available from the authors upon request, including the entire
matrix of valuations.

11

In order to save space, the equations shown in Figure A.1 are simplified to an annual representation
of the stock variables’ accumulation processes. Using a time step different than one year, alters
slightly the look of these equations but does not affect the essential aspects of the processes.
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Table A.1: List of Variables and Functions
production (billion US$2000)
Yi,t
consumption (billion US$2000)
Zi,t
investment (billion US$2000)
Ii,t
capital stock (billion US$2000)
K i,t
E i,t

carbon emissions (billion tons of carbon, btC)

μi,t

emission reduction (between zero and one)

C ( μi,t )

emission reduction cost function (fraction of GDP, between zero and one)

ΔTt

global mean temperature change (°C)

Di ( ΔTt )

climate change damage function (fraction of GDP, between zero and one)

Wi

welfare measured as aggregated discounted consumption
atmospheric carbon concentration (btC)

M att
M uo
t
lo
Mt

carbon concentration in upper strata ocean (btC)
carbon concentration in lower strata ocean (btC)

Ft

radiative forcing (Watt per m2)

Ttat

atmospheric temperature (°C)

Tt0

lower ocean temperature (°C)
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Table A.2: Global Parameters

ai,t

Productivity

exogenous

Li,t

Population

exogenous

α i,t

emission-output rate

exogenous

Ftx

Exogenous radiative forcing

exogenous

δK
γ
ρ

annual rate of capital depreciation
capital productivity parameter
annual rate of time preference
terminal year
parameter carbon cycle
parameter carbon cycle
parameter carbon cycle
parameter carbon cycle
parameter carbon cycle

0.10
0.25
0.01*
2330
-0.033384
0.033384
0.027607
-0.039103
0.011496

parameter carbon cycle
parameter carbon cycle
parameter global temperature module
parameter global temperature module
parameter global temperature module

0.000422
-0.000422
0.226
0.440
0.020

Ω
τ11
τ12
τ21
τ22
τ23
τ32
τ33
τ1
τ2
τ3
λ

M

parameter global temperature module
Initial (=2000) atmospheric carbon concentration

M

Initial (=2000) carbon concentration in upper strata ocean

807

btC

M

Initial (=2000) carbon concentration in lower strata ocean

19238

btC

T

Initial (=2000) atmospheric temperature

0.622

°C

at
0
uo
0
lo
0
at
0
0
0

1.410
783

btC

0.108
°C
Initial (=2000) lower ocean temperature
T
* The sensitivity analysis is conducted for values 0.02 and 0.03.
Details for the time path of exogenous parameters and calibration of carbon cycle and
temperature module are available from the authors upon request.
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Table A.3: Regional Parameters

θi,1
θi,2
bi,1
bi,2
USA
0.01102
2.0
0.07
2.887
JPN
0.01174
2.0
0.05
2.887
EU
0.01174
2.0
0.05
2.887
CHN
0.01523
2.0
0.15
2.887
FSU
0.00857
2.0
0.15
2.887
ROW
0.02093
2.0
0.10
2.887
Source: RICE_96 model by Nordhaus and Yang (1996).
Table A.4: Regional Initial (=2000) Data

Yi,0
Li,0
K i,0
E i,0
USA
7563.810
282.224
19740.689
1.574
JPN
3387.931
126.87
9753.970
0.330
EU
8446.901
377.136
22804.477
0.888
CHN
968.906
1262.645
2686.056
0.947
FSU
558.436
287.893
1490.038
0.626
ROW
6633.427
3715.663
14105.209
2.192
WORLD
27559.411
6052.431
70580.438
6.556
billion US$2000
million
billion US$2000
billion tons
(market exchange
people
carbon btC
rate)
(fossil fuel use)
Source: World Resources Institute http://www.wri.org (for Yi,0 and Ei,0 ), UN
Economic and Social Affairs division (for Li,0 ) and own calibration (for K i,0 ).
Details are available from the authors upon request.
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Appendix 2
START

Kˆ := ∅ , Tˆ := ∅ , Aˆ := ∅ , cˆ := ∅
Iˆ := I , aˆ := min Iˆ

â makes proposal T̂ ⊂ I \ K̂ with â ∈ Tˆ ,
iˆ := aˆ ,
Aˆ := {iˆ}

if Tˆ ≠ Aˆ
else

Kˆ := Kˆ ∪ Tˆ , cˆ := cˆ ∪ { T̂ }

then
if K̂ = I
then
aˆ := min ( Tˆ \ Â )

END

if

else
Tˆ := ∅ , Aˆ := ∅ ,
Iˆ := I \ K̂
aˆ := min Iˆ

â accepts the
proposal Tˆ

then

else
Iˆ := Iˆ \{ iˆ }

Aˆ := Aˆ ∪ { â }

if Iˆ = ∅

else

then
if â ∈ Iˆ

then

∀j ∈ I \ Kˆ : cˆ := cˆ ∪ {{j}}
else
END
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Table 1: Overview of Selected Coalition Structures and their Welfare Implications*
Rank

Coalition Structure

Valuations without Transfers

Valuation with Transfers

USA

JPN

EU

CHN

FSU

ROW

USA

JPN

EU

CHN

FSU

ROW

World

CGX

1

{USA,JPN,EU,CHN,FSU,ROW}

255882.2

48068.1

179478.3

308069.3

19038.2

359617.9

257401.2

48116.1

179507.6

307220.6

19417.5

358490.8

1170154

100.0

2

{USA,EU,CHN,FSU,ROW},{JPN}

255793.3

48435.0

179368.4

307762.0

19041.8

359127.1

257267.1

48435

179408.9

306960.3

19408.5

358047.7

1169528

97.9

3

{USA,JPN,EU,CHN,ROW},{FSU}

255686.8

48029.6

179319.5

307610.7

19622.1

358882.0

257232.0

48085.9

179385.9

306892.3

19622.1

357932.4

1169151

96.7

4

{USA,EU,CHN,ROW},{JPN,FSU}

255613.6

48393.4

179229.2

307361.9

19603.1

358486.6

257119.4

48448.9

179306.9

306685.0

19547.6

357580.0

1168688

95.1

5

{USA,EU,CHN,ROW},{JPN},{FSU}

255590.1

48390.2

179212.7

307314.3

19604.3

358409.0

257095.3

48390.2

179289.9

306638.8

19604.3

357502.2

1168521

94.6

6

{USA,JPN,CHN,FSU,ROW},{EU}

255592.8

47979.2

180526.1

307021.0

19059.2

357931.3

256915.2

48029.0

180526.1

306307.3

19386.1

356945.9

93.2

16

{USA},{JPN,EU,CHN,FSU,ROW}

258283.8

47886.3

178712.9

305884.7

19045.5

356069.0

258283.8

47963.2

178896.8

305609.3

19362.1

355767.0

1168110
1165882

17

{USA,JPN,EU,FSU,ROW},{CHN}

255393.4

47872.6

178657.4

308478.0

19117.0

356225.0

256298.4

47919.5

178721.3

308478.0

19345.0

354980.3

1165743

85.4

{USA},{JPN},{EU},{CHN},
{FSU,ROW}

255723.7

47788.2

178265.1

304393.3

19155.1

352360.0

255723.7

47788.2

178265.1

304393.3

19289.5

352225.5

1157685

58.6

{USA},{JPN,ROW},{EU},{CHN},
{FSU}

255705.1

47660.4

178251.7

304362.0

19332.1

352195.0

255705.1

47759.9

178251.7

304362.0

19332.1

352095.5

1157506

58.1

152

{USA,JPN,EU,CHN,FSU},{ROW}

253310.9

47467.0

176958.1

300739.6

19016.4

350146.7

253718.4

47470.1

176907.2

300219.1

19177.1

350146.7

1147639

25.3

157

{USA,JPN,CHN,FSU,},{EU},
{ROW}

253151.6

47416.4

177134.2

300178.2

19037.5

348238.3

253464.8

47426.3

177134.2

299732.3

19160.4

348238.3

1145156

17.1

167

{USA},{JPN,EU,CHN,FSU},
{ROW}

253722.2

47376.6

176572.6

299713.5

19038.2

347037.4

253722.2

47405.3

176644.5

299498.8

19152.3

347037.4

1143461

11.5

173

{USA,JPN,EU,FSU},{CHN},{ROW}

253282

47396.9

176655.7

300001.6

19094.0

346569.3

253283.1

47394.9

176602.3

300001.6

19148.3

346569.3

1142999

9.9

195

{USA},{JPN,EU,FSU},{CHN},{ROW}

253219.5

47369.1

176534.5

299267.3

19120.0

345276.0

253219.5

47372.5

176511.4

299267.3

19139.7

345276.0

1140787

2.6

203

{USA},{JPN},{EU},{CHN},{FSU},
{ROW}

253104.6

47364.1

176477.5

299040.1

19136.5

344878.6

253104.6

47364.1

176477.5

299040.1

19136.5

344878.6

1140001

150
151

85.8

0.0

* Rank: rank of coalition structure in the list of all coalition structures sorted in descending order of global welfare (column “World”); valuations are billion US dollars expressed in 2000
levels, rounded to the first digit; World: sum of valuations of all six regions (i.e. global welfare); CGX: global welfare expressed in terms of closing the gap index:
n
n
100 ⋅ ∑ i =1 (vi (c) −vi (c N )) / ∑ i =1 (vi (c F ) −vi (c N )) where welfare is discounted lifetime consumption integrated over 2000-2300 (see section 3.1), global welfare with full cooperation is denoted
n
n
by ∑ i =1 vi (c F ) ( c F =coalition structure No. 1), global welfare with no cooperation is denoted by ∑ i =1 vi (c N ) ( c N =coalition structure No. 203) and global welfare in some coalition structure c
n
is denoted by ∑ i =1 vi (c) ; abbreviation of regions as explained in the text in section 3.1; bold numbers indicate highest valuation of a region among the set of valuations V(C) and V T (C) ,
respectively.

(

)(

)
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Table 2: Equilibrium Coalition Structures for No Transfers and Transfers*

No Transfers
Coalition Structure
{USA,EU,FSU},{JPN},{CHN,ROW}
{USA,JPN,EU},{CHN,ROW},{FSU}
{USA,EU},{JPN},{CHN,ROW},{FSU}
{USA,JPN,FSU},{EU},{CHN,ROW}
{USA},{JPN},{EU,FSU},{CHN,ROW}
{USA},{JPN,EU},{CHN,ROW},{FSU}
{USA,ROW},{JPN},{EU,FSU},{CHN}
{USA,ROW},{JPN,EU},{CHN},{FSU}
{USA,ROW},{JPN,FSU},{EU},{CHN}
{USA,ROW},{JPN},{EU},{CHN},{FSU}
{USA},{JPN},{EU,ROW},{CHN},{FSU}

USA

JPN

EU

1
3
5
2
4
6
8
9
10
11
7

1
3
2
5
4
6
7
10
8
9
11

1
3
4
2
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Coalition Structure
USA
{USA,EU,CHN,ROW},{JPN},{FSU}
{USA},{JPN},{EU,FSU},{CHN,ROW}

Ranking
CHN FSU
5
6
8
9
10
11
1
2
3
4
7

9
1
2
5
4
3
10
6
8
7
11

Transfers
Ranking
JPN EU CHN FSU

2
1

1
2

1
2

1
2

1
2

CGX
ROW

World

1
2
3
4
9
10
5
6
7
8
11

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

ROW

World

1
2

1
2

80.7
80.3
78.2
76.2
73.7
73.4
72.2
71.9
71.3
70.8
63.8
∅ = 77.3

CGX

PO

FR

yes/yes
yes/yes
yes/yes
yes/yes
no/no
no/no
no/yes
no/yes
no/yes
no/yes
no/no

32
52
515
1
16
4
8
10
2
78
2

PO

FR

94.6
yes/yes 706
73.7
no/yes
14
∅ = 94.2
* Ranking: ranking of equilibrium coalition structures in terms of valuations “World” in descending order; CGX: closing the gap
index as explained in Table 1, ∅ =average welfare over all possible index sequences; PO: first entry = Pareto-optimal coalition
structure in the set of all coalition structures, second entry = Pareto-optimal coalition structure in the set of equilibria; FR: frequence
of appearance of coalition structure as an equilibrium out of the total number of index sequences that is 720.

Table 3: First-Mover Advantage to Enforce Best and to Avoid Worst Equilibrium*

No Transfers
USA

JPN

EU

CHN

FSU

ROW

Best Equilibrium

93.8

43.8

18.8

100

73.1

18.8

Worst Equilibrium

15.4

100

0

50

0

0

Transfers
USA

JPN

EU

CHN

FSU

ROW

Best Equilibrium

100

50.4

50.1

49.3

50.1

51

Worst Equilibrium

49

28.6

42.9

85.7

42.9

0

* Numbers are percentages of region i having an index number equal or smaller than 3 with respect to the the best and worst
equilibrium coalition structure from player i’s perspective in Table 2. Bold entries: %>50 for Best Equilibrium and %<50 for Worst
Equilibrium indicate first-mover advantage.
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